From: Sandy Sandfort <sandfort@crl.com>
Date: Mon, 28 Mar 94 16:43:31 PST
To: Jim_Miller@bilbo.suite.com
Subject: Re: cfp '94 transcript
In-Reply-To: <9403282300.AA25661@bilbo.suite.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.87.9403281657.A11893-0100000@crl.crl.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


C'punks,

On Mon, 28 Mar 1994, Jim Miller wrote:

> . . .
> 
> A better question to ask would be...
> 
> Are there any software or hardware mechanisms, or combinations of  
> software and hardware mechanisms, present in the Clipper/EES system  
> that supports or enables decryption of intercepted Clipper/EES  
> communications without access to escrowed unit keys?
> 
> Does that cover it well enough?

I don't think so.  There might be some aspect of the "escrowed" keys that 
would allow them to be accessed from duplicates or some other end run.  
The question should include inquiries that address the accessibility of 
the keys outside of the "warrant issued upon a showing of probable cause" 
view that many people have fallen for.

 S a n d y