From: rishab@dxm.ernet.in
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: 25cb3502b3646a2d138dfd32a421075910fa562366d226b0658c68baf877a341
Message ID: <gate.PJHVJc1w165w@dxm.ernet.in>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1994-03-30 00:24:55 UTC
Raw Date: Tue, 29 Mar 94 16:24:55 PST
From: rishab@dxm.ernet.in
Date: Tue, 29 Mar 94 16:24:55 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Call setup without warrants?
Message-ID: <gate.PJHVJc1w165w@dxm.ernet.in>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Everyone talks about the DTII Act's allowing the monitoring of 'call setup
information' without a warrant. I can't seem to find where exactly in the text
of the Act is this stated. All paragraphs about call setup information mention
the requirement of 'court order or lawful authorization,' exactly as required
for interception. These include Section 3a(1)-(4) defining the 'assistance
requirements' of common carriers, as well as 3i(7), which defines 'call setup
information':
> (7) 'call set up information' shall mean the information
> generated which identifies the origin and destination of a wire or
> electronic communication placed to, or received by, the facility or
> service that is the subject of a court order or lawful authorization,
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> including information associated with any telecommunication system dialing
> or calling features or services;
In the EFF's section-wise analysis of the draft bill last month, there was no
indication of any loopholes in the 'lawful authorization' bit. The only thing
I noticed was the 'routability exceptions' in Section 3a(4) allowing monitoring
at the common carrier's premises about which the EFF analysis said:
> The exceptions to this "routability requirement" occur when a criminal or
> intelligence emergency pre-empts the normal process of seeking an order,
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> or when there is an attempt by the person committing an offense to thwart
> interception by changing facilities. These types of situations are provided
> for under current law.
However, it seems clear that (a) this is exceptional and (b) it is equally
applicable to *both* call setup as well as interception.
What I want to know is whether I'm missing any basis *in the Act itself* for
this assumption of CS information without authorization? If not, is there any
other *specific* basis, such as that for the possible outlawing of encryption
in the statement that "there is no constitutional guarantee to unbreakable
crypto?"
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Rishab Aiyer Ghosh "What is civilisation
rishab@doe.ernet.in, rishab@dxm.ernet.in but a ribonucleic
Voicemail +91 11 3760335; Vox/Fax/Data 6853410 hangover?"
H-34C Saket New Delhi 110017 INDIA
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1994-03-30 (Tue, 29 Mar 94 16:24:55 PST) - Call setup without warrants? - rishab@dxm.ernet.in