1994-03-24 - Promise her anything…

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From: mpd@netcom.com (Mike Duvos)
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: 43b10b90644faeb2f0b817718ad31a536d72e18600566e0dab5807244d8d4b74
Message ID: <199403241808.KAA26424@mail.netcom.com>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1994-03-24 18:07:38 UTC
Raw Date: Thu, 24 Mar 94 10:07:38 PST

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From: mpd@netcom.com (Mike Duvos)
Date: Thu, 24 Mar 94 10:07:38 PST
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Promise her anything...
Message-ID: <199403241808.KAA26424@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hal writes:

> Now, the more elaborate technology of digital cash can actually go a long
> way towards solving this problem, at least in theory.  With this approach,
> each note has a unique serial number, and part of the agreement is that only
> the first presentation of a note with any given serial number will be
> honored.  Then if the holder of a note wants to sell it to someone else,
> they go through a protocol with the borrower in which he verifies that the
> note has not been spent, and a new note is issued with a new serial number
> that nobody has seen before.  This way the buyer of the note is protected
> against being sold an already-sold note.  Plus, the digital cash technology
> allows this to be done without the debtor finding out who is selling his
> old notes to whom.  There is no reason for him to have this information; the
> holder of the note ought to be able to sell it privately, and this is
> a good way of preserving that aspect of the transaction.

Rather than have the holder and the person to whom the note is being sold
go through a transaction with the issuer, one can have the issuer give his
customers a cryptographically tamperproof software module which will
prevent anonymous double-spending.  This allows the digital cash system to
work "offline" without having to connect to the bank every time two people
wish to conduct a transaction. 

> Perhaps some form of registered mail for note redemptions, plus a requirement
> that when a conflict like this arises both presenters must identify themselves,
> could address some of these problems.  (These problems arise for digital cash
> just as much, by the way.)

If you design the system so that cheating breaks the anonymity and identifies
the perpetrator, then you can simply deter it in the same way we do with 
conventional instruments.  Give the person a horrible credit rating and 
threaten to toss him in jail.  

-- 
     Mike Duvos         $    PGP 2.3a Public Key available    $
     mpd@netcom.com     $    via Finger.                      $





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