1994-03-14 - Hey…

Header Data

From: jmueller@gac.edu (Joel T Mueller)
To: crf_stohlmnr@crf.cuis.edu (Nathan Stohlmann)
Message Hash: 96e57c48d5c1374a876c5f64f96194fed7544033a1fc9eb6e244df1eba198dcc
Message ID: <9403142344.AA01434@gac.edu>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1994-03-14 23:45:59 UTC
Raw Date: Mon, 14 Mar 94 15:45:59 PST

Raw message

From: jmueller@gac.edu (Joel T Mueller)
Date: Mon, 14 Mar 94 15:45:59 PST
To: crf_stohlmnr@crf.cuis.edu (Nathan Stohlmann)
Subject: Hey...
Message-ID: <9403142344.AA01434@gac.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


    It's just occurred to me - say that all the petitions against clipper are
ignored, clipper becomes mandatory, and other methods of encryption are
outlawed, and clipper gets a user base of several million.  One
well-placed explosive device that destroys even one of the two escrow
databases, and suddenly the government has supplied us with
secure encryption that even they can't break.  
    Of course, that is assuming that the government didn't lie and make 
extra backup copies (just for safety's sake, you understand, against just
such a threat) that are kept somewhere out of public scrutiny, so that
wiretaps can be made on a large scale without alarming people monitoring
the access of the "official" database.  Say all this happens.  Maybe the
government will even be the one to rig the explosion.  Suddenly people lose
all their reservations about using Clipper products.  The government
decides to give up escrowing keys (officially).  But they can still listen
in everywhere, and people won't be guarded.
    That first paragraph is also assuming that they didn't build in a back
door to the encryption system.  But then essentially the same scenario
would apply.

-- 
     Joel Mueller - <Insert your favorite witty quote here; I'm tired.>
  GAT/O -d+(---) -p+ c++@ l+ u++ e m+ s+/- n- h-- f+@ g+(-) w+ t(--) ry? 
     PGP 2.3a Public Key : finger jmueller@gac.edu or on keyservers.
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