From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (bill.stewart@pleasantonca.ncr.com +1-510-484-6204)
To: habs@warwick.com
Message Hash: d731f804923fe36dd6bf7b4fc0d9304351d445d38d724808a8444c2a92641f6c
Message ID: <9403310139.AA19008@anchor.ho.att.com>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1994-03-31 01:41:12 UTC
Raw Date: Wed, 30 Mar 94 17:41:12 PST
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (bill.stewart@pleasantonca.ncr.com +1-510-484-6204)
Date: Wed, 30 Mar 94 17:41:12 PST
To: habs@warwick.com
Subject: Re: Another view of the CFP
Message-ID: <9403310139.AA19008@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Harry Shapiro Hawk wrote:
> The White House Guy wrote:
> - Clipper-encrypted messages may be further encrypted with another
> cryptosystem. However, messages may not be encrypted before being
> encrypted with Clipper.
> I can understand why they would want to do this as a policy.
> e.g., they can see who is using other encryption
> 1) Was he saying they would make this the law?
> 2) Is there any technical reason it should be this way?
The proposed standards I've seen on the net say you can't encrypt
*after* using Clipper, because that makes Clipper key-theft useless.
On the other hand, encryption with real systems before encrypting with
Clipper is undetectable until after they decrypt the Clipper, so it's
hard to enforce except on people who are already suspects,
and is unlikely to be convenient to implement (for interoperability)
on some of the major Clipper targets, like cellphones and fax machines.
...... Wiretap the usual suspects!
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