1994-03-02 - Re: clipper + enaction = illegal alternate encryption

Header Data

From: deeb@meceng.coe.neu.edu (Stephen Humble)
To: rcain@netcom.com
Message Hash: ec6a2d4193947f6de4cef306668527fea17445260f9bf81184584362ee722167
Message ID: <9403021716.AA15267@meceng.coe.neu.edu>
Reply To: <199403020257.SAA26110@netcom9.netcom.com>
UTC Datetime: 1994-03-02 17:18:29 UTC
Raw Date: Wed, 2 Mar 94 09:18:29 PST

Raw message

From: deeb@meceng.coe.neu.edu (Stephen Humble)
Date: Wed, 2 Mar 94 09:18:29 PST
To: rcain@netcom.com
Subject: Re: clipper + enaction = illegal alternate encryption
In-Reply-To: <199403020257.SAA26110@netcom9.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9403021716.AA15267@meceng.coe.neu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


rcain@netcom.com (Robert Cain) sez:
> There really is a strong argument from their side that says if one
> must use a form that is immune from a compromise like well escrowed
> keys one is *way* more than likely to be discussing something most
> of us would want LE or NS to know about.  I know that argument is
> anathema here but I am finding it more and more compelling.

I think "anathema" may be the wrong word - I would suggest
"incorrect".  As the number of people who habitually use strong crypto
grows, the nefarious conversations will be lost in the noise about
last night's party and recipes for chocolate truffle cake.  The
likelihood that any particular conversation is of interest to LE/NS
types must drop as well.  This will be true unless the number of
strongly-encrypted nefarious conversations grows at least as fast as
the total number of strongly-encrypted conversations.  Somehow I fail
to believe that the supply of crooks is so large.







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