From: Mikolaj Habryn <dichro@tartarus.uwa.edu.au>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: 2ed5bf40b98fad125c5cad1f53ac8848630f0d8df8e468b8a91e8255a716f957
Message ID: <199404260112.JAA21638@lethe.uwa.edu.au>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1994-04-26 01:12:33 UTC
Raw Date: Mon, 25 Apr 94 18:12:33 PDT
From: Mikolaj Habryn <dichro@tartarus.uwa.edu.au>
Date: Mon, 25 Apr 94 18:12:33 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: clipper not end of world
Message-ID: <199404260112.JAA21638@lethe.uwa.edu.au>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
I'm reposting this 'cause i don't think it got through the first time...
I seem to remember someone once writing that with the proposed
clipper laws, you are allowed to encrypt messages before piping them
through the clip chip, but the output must be left unaltered. The problem
to this is that then whoever does the audits knows who's being sneaky.
(Or something like that - i don't remember precisely.)
Seems to me, if one is talking about videophone type devices,
they are transmitting quite a great deal of info, and stegging in a
message is quite feasible, is it not? You don't even have to do much of a
hardware modification. Do something like having an HF carrier tone in the
background, that anyone listening to it can't detect without the knowing
what they're listenong for. Or insert a microburst transmission - it'll
look like static.
This is not to say, that the clip chip isn't worth fighting
against, just that, as always, someone's going to come with a way around
it. It's human nature, really.
* * Mikolaj J. Habryn
dichro@tartarus.uwa.edu.au
* "Life begins at '040."
PGP Public key available by finger
* "Spaghetti code means job security!"
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