1994-04-24 - Privacy with clipper

Header Data

From: Mikolaj Habryn <dichro@tartarus.uwa.edu.au>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: 938871647365ad2cade091a2b4d2468fd7e6607e5d0d8bd2b4d5b3d9dc8ee26d
Message ID: <199404241541.XAA04121@lethe.uwa.edu.au>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1994-04-24 15:42:11 UTC
Raw Date: Sun, 24 Apr 94 08:42:11 PDT

Raw message

From: Mikolaj Habryn <dichro@tartarus.uwa.edu.au>
Date: Sun, 24 Apr 94 08:42:11 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Privacy with clipper
Message-ID: <199404241541.XAA04121@lethe.uwa.edu.au>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	I seem to remember someone once writing that with the proposed 
clipper laws, you are allowed to encrypt messages before piping them 
through the clip chip, but the output must be left unaltered. The problem 
to this is that then whoever does the audits knows who's being sneaky. 
(Or something like that - i don't remember precisely.)
	Seems to me, if one is talking about videophone type devices, 
they are transmitting quite a great deal of info, and stegging in a 
message is quite feasible, is it not? You don't even have to do much of a 
hardware modification. Do something like having an HF carrier tone in the 
background, that anyone listening to it can't detect without the knowing 
what they're listenong for. Or insert a microburst transmission - it'll 
look like static.
	This is not to say, that the clip chip isn't worth fighting 
against, just that, as always, someone's going to come with a way around 
it. It's human nature, really.

*       *       Mikolaj J. Habryn
                dichro@tartarus.uwa.edu.au
    *           "Life begins at '040."
                PGP Public key available by finger
    *           "Spaghetti code means job security!"





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