1994-05-26 - Re: dispersed DES

Header Data

From: David C. Taylor <dct@python.cs.byu.edu>
To: mab@crypto.com (Matt Blaze)
Message Hash: 05e53f303e1b78ebfa9492f72d757bd8f443a530cd6bc89108e29d196fecfc4c
Message ID: <9405261519.AA01739@toad.com>
Reply To: <9405261503.AA23050@crypto.com>
UTC Datetime: 1994-05-26 15:19:37 UTC
Raw Date: Thu, 26 May 94 08:19:37 PDT

Raw message

From: David C. Taylor <dct@python.cs.byu.edu>
Date: Thu, 26 May 94 08:19:37 PDT
To: mab@crypto.com (Matt Blaze)
Subject: Re: dispersed DES
In-Reply-To: <9405261503.AA23050@crypto.com>
Message-ID: <9405261519.AA01739@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Good point about the source of the appended bytes.  The reason I think it might
be more secure is that the length of the appended segment is less than the
length of the key on each pass, so it would seem to be the equivalent of a
one-time pad for those relying on the appended bytes to get the key.  That is my
only basis for not worrying about wekening effects.  Any holes?

dct@newt.cs.byu.edu





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