1994-05-28 - Re: (fwd) Re: NSA Helped Yeltsin Foil 1991 Coup

Header Data

From: Jay Prime Positive <jpp@jpplap.markv.com>
To: ebrandt@jarthur.cs.hmc.edu
Message Hash: 27a9ffd76a79433d479539662b3752e0c2eb89ce533718c7788bb99dbf7b6306
Message ID: <m0q7Gx8-0003paC@jpplap>
Reply To: <9405280544.AA01300@toad.com>
UTC Datetime: 1994-05-28 07:24:19 UTC
Raw Date: Sat, 28 May 94 00:24:19 PDT

Raw message

From: Jay Prime Positive <jpp@jpplap.markv.com>
Date: Sat, 28 May 94 00:24:19 PDT
To: ebrandt@jarthur.cs.hmc.edu
Subject: Re: (fwd) Re: NSA Helped Yeltsin Foil 1991 Coup
In-Reply-To: <9405280544.AA01300@toad.com>
Message-ID: <m0q7Gx8-0003paC@jpplap>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain

> Date: Fri, 27 May 94 22:44:29 PDT
> From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.cs.hmc.edu>
> Jay said:
> > It requires computing one extra xor per block.
> Plus a truckload of good random numbers.  To do it right, a hardware
> RNG is in order.  A PRNG really makes no sense, because if you
> have a PRNG that strong, why not just use it as a stream cipher?

  I don't see why.  I assume the PRNG is cryptographic, and concider
its key (and iv) as part of the key to the system.  And I don't see
why the PRNG needs to be so tremendously strong.

  Hmmm.  Now I think I get it.  If the PRNG is the weak link, then the
atacker can solve the easy PRNG crypto system and the hard e1 crypo
system.  On the other hand if it is the strongest crypto system, the
atacker will solve the weaker e1 and e2 crypto systems instead.

  Hmmm.  Yeah, you are right.  Although the PRNG threshold scheme has
E1*E2*E3 permutations, it is really only as hard as either E1*E2, or
E1*E3.  Yet another example of 'key size is not proportional to

  So my new criteria is if you have bandwidth, and strong random
numbers, use the threshold scheme.  If not, use the product cypher.
But perhaps the fenced DES stratagy is better than either.  For
comparison purposes we would need to know how the fence permutation(s)
are keyed.

> > that the actual increase in bandwidth for a three cypher system
> > threshold in a practical encryption package like PGP would not be 2 to
> > 1 since it likely compresses before encryption.)
> To be fair, you need to compare compressed-and-split with
> compressed-only.  This *is* going to be a factor-of-3 size hit.

  Yeah, your are right.  The Cthr/Cpro will be about 2 to 1.  (2 cause
I used one key for the PRNG, the other two for encrypting the
thresholded pieces.)  But Cthr/Plain will not be nearly 2 to 1.

  I think this is interesting.  If you, Eli, think it is interesting
enough for the general list, feel free to forward this.