From: grendel@netaxs.com (Michael Handler)
Date: Mon, 23 May 94 15:24:57 PDT
To: rishab@dxm.ernet.in
Subject: Re: Skipjack backdoor? NOT!
In-Reply-To: <gate.BRksmc1w165w@dxm.ernet.in>
Message-ID: <199405231925.PAA14786@access.netaxs.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> If they were that smart, they'd simply have made Skipjack weak enough to
> easily break, and not cause all the outcry by suggesting escrows.

	The thing is, the rest of the law enforcement agencies and the 
government have wised up to how easily people can be monitored on the 
Internet and other computer networks. Now, these other agencies want the 
NSA's ability to monitor encrypted communications, but the NSA, in 
typical spook fashion, is understandably reluctant to let other agencies 
in on its deep dark secrets of cryptanalysis. So, they created the 
Clipper scheme, which is a compromise.
	[1] It has a key-escrow scheme, so those other agencies, who 
actually have to worry about little things like the validity of searches 
and the Constitutionality of their actions, can go through proper 
channels and legally obtain the plaintext of the messages.
	[2] My guess is that Skipjack is compromised in some way (not 
releasing the algorithm was *really* suspicious) or that the NSA can 
easily break 80-bit keys, so that the NSA can continue to have a leg up 
on all of the other agencies (ie they don't have to deal with the key 
escrow departments or other little trivial legal details).
	Considering how easily RSA-129 was broken, my guess is that 
80-bit keys are a joke for the NSA.

	All IMAO, of course.

-- 
Michael Brandt Handler					 <grendel@netaxs.com>
Philadelphia, PA, USA	      PGP v2.3a public key via server / finger / mail
"I am iron, I am steel, nobody can touch me when I'm on the wheel"  --  Curve