From: mgream@acacia.itd.uts.edu.au (Matthew Gream)
Date: Wed, 25 May 94 15:53:36 PDT
To: hayden@krypton.mankato.msus.edu (Robert A. Hayden)
Subject: Re: PGP 2.6 is dangerous in the long term ?
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.89.9405251412.A25354-0100000@krypton.mankato.msus.edu>
Message-ID: <9405252255.AA09419@acacia.itd.uts.EDU.AU>
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Earlier, Robert A. Hayden wrote:

> > Bizdos and gang will _still_ hold the patent on RSA-style public key
> > encryption.  What you're suggesting is, in essence, exactly what Phil
> > Zimmerman did with PGP 1.0.
> 
> Ah, ok.  I wasn't sure if the patent covered just the use of the 
> algorithm or also the use of public-key-like systems.  As I said, I am 
> most likely completely wrong :-)

Not if you're referring to some form of "PGP:ng" or otherwise similar
software that can interrogate and support several possible public key
algorithms. The ASN.1 encoded PKCS packets are deliberately designed
with algorithmic identifiers so that "smart" software can entertain not
just RSA, but say El-Gamal or DSA algorithms -- in fact, anything you
car to devise. The same applies to symmetric encryption and signature
packets.

One could piss off RSA entirely and go with DSA, whose only
disadvantage being ciphertext doubling is so trivial it doesn't warrant
a mention. 

Matthew.

-- 
Matthew Gream
Consent Technologies
Sydney, (02) 821-2043
M.Gream@uts.edu.au