1994-05-06 - Re: Clipper Key Escrow Details

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From: koontzd@lrcs.loral.com (David Koontz )
To: grendel@netaxs.com
Message Hash: d7401930a8e59782f80fbacbb49cfd0ef6b8d2deaffa3b050815e4ceaa4534cf
Message ID: <9405061700.AA23421@io.lrcs.loral.com>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1994-05-06 17:03:27 UTC
Raw Date: Fri, 6 May 94 10:03:27 PDT

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From: koontzd@lrcs.loral.com (David Koontz )
Date: Fri, 6 May 94 10:03:27 PDT
To: grendel@netaxs.com
Subject: Re:  Clipper Key Escrow Details
Message-ID: <9405061700.AA23421@io.lrcs.loral.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>From: grendel@netaxs.com (Michael Brandt Handler)
>Posted-Date: Fri, 6 May 1994 07:05:38 -0400

>Regarding the Clipper Key Escrow scheme:

>        [1] Who has the ability to submit a warrant and request the key
data from the two controlling government agencies?

Its even worse than that.  They have a catch phrase - "other legal
authority", where some do not require a warrant.

>        [2] What is to stop someone, once they have my escrowed key data,
>from archiving it for later use?

While not having formally answered this, it has been indicated that the
unit key is sent encrypted to a decoder box, which can disassemble the
LEAF and extract the session key.  I believe this decoder is based on a
PC, which leaves one to wonder about even the possibility of timelocking
the transaction.
(the crypto algorithm is contained in a chip on a P.C. board.)





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