cryptoanarchy.wiki

Arise, you have nothing to lose but your barbed wire fences!

1994-06-03 - more info from talk at MIT yesterday.

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From: Eric_Weaver@avtc.sel.sony.com (Eric Weaver)
To: sommerfeld@localhost.medford.ma.us
Message Hash: 21092f0f50c9ff0fe947f6099516ee5f0dd525a1059525788ed97afa68622250
Message ID: <9406031652.AA10205@sosfc.avtc.sel.sony.com>
Reply To: <199406031357.JAA00376@localhost>
UTC Datetime: 1994-06-03 16:52:23 UTC
Raw Date: Fri, 3 Jun 94 09:52:23 PDT

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From: Eric_Weaver@avtc.sel.sony.com (Eric Weaver)
Date: Fri, 3 Jun 94 09:52:23 PDT
To: sommerfeld@localhost.medford.ma.us
Subject: more info from talk at MIT yesterday.
In-Reply-To: <199406031357.JAA00376@localhost>
Message-ID: <9406031652.AA10205@sosfc.avtc.sel.sony.com>
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Content-Type: text/plain


   Date: Fri, 3 Jun 1994 09:57:36 -0400
   From: sommerfeld@localhost.medford.ma.us (Bill Sommerfeld)

   They [The NSA] also had a comment that they considered Blaze's
   findings to be mostly irrelevant, as the only people who would use
   it would be persons who *didn't* trust the escrow system, but *did*
   trust the algorithm...

					   - Bill

OOOooooo.  I think this means one had better use superencryption of
one kind or another with Clipper at all times.  Pardon me if this
is redundant, but has anybody done any differential analysis of, say,
DES (or 3DES) under Clipper, to see if it weakens?

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