From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Wed, 15 Jun 94 13:25:12 PDT
To: comp-org-eff-news@cs.utexas.edu (comp.org.eff.news)
Subject: Rep. Brooks speaks out against export controls -- DO NOT DIST
Message-ID: <199406152019.QAA05407@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Rep. Brooks submitted the following statment on encryption export controls
today.  You may with to send a "thanks" or "great statement" note of kudos
to Rep. Brooks (Chair of the House Judiciary Cmte., and longtime detractor
of Clipper. He's involved in these issues on several fronts.)

NOTE: Even after today, keep faxing, calling, writing.  It DOES make a
difference.  If the bill is butchered, express your opinion on that.  It
won't get changed otherwise.  If it passes the Intell. Cmte. with flying
colors, send notes of thanks and approval.  GET INVOLVED, otherwise
politics control the people instead of vice versa.


*****************************************************************************

Floor Statement of Congressman Jack Brooks
U.S. House of Representatives
re:  Encryption Export Controls
June 15, 1994

ENCRYPTION POLICY ENDANGERS U.S. COMPETITIVENESS
IN GLOBAL MARKETPLACE


        For some time now, a debate has been raging in the media and in the
halls of Congress over the Administration's intention to require U.S.
corporations to use and market the Clipper Chip, an encryption device
developed in secret by the National Security Agency.

        The Clipper Chip will provide industry and others with the ability
to encode telephone and computer communications.  The use of the Clipper
Chip as the U.S. encryption standard is a concept promoted by both the
intelligence and law enforcement communities because it is designed with a
back door to make it relatively easy for these agencies to listen in on
these communications.

        The law enforcement and intelligence communities have a legitimate
concern that advances in technology will make their jobs more difficult. 
But the issue here is whether attempts to restrict the development, use and
export of encryption amounts to closing the barn door after the horse has
already escaped.

        The notion that we can limit encryption is just plain fanciful. 
Encryption technology is available worldwide -- and will become more
available as time goes on.

        First, generally available software with encryption capabilities is
sold within the U.S. at thousands of retail outlets, by mail, even over the
phone.  These programs may be transferred abroad in minutes by anyone using
a public telephone line and a computer modem.

        Second, it is estimated that over 200 programs from some 22
countries -- including Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Japan,
India, and South Africa -- use some form of encryption that the government
currently prohibits U.S. companies from exporting.  And this is just the
beginning.  According to the May 16, 1994 issue of _Fortune_ , not only
are U.S. companies willing to purchase foreign encryption devices, American
produces of encrypted software are also moving production overseas to
escape the current U.S. export controls.

        Third, encryption techniques and technology are well understood
throughout the world.  Encryption is routinely taught in computer science
programs.  Text books explain the underlying encryption technology. 
International organizations have published protocols for implementing high
level encryption.  Actual implementations of encryption -- programs ready
to use by even computer novices -- are on the Internet.

        The only result of continued U.S. export controls is to threaten
the continued preeminence of America's computer software and hardware
companies in the world markets.  These restrictive policies jeopardize the
health of American companies, and the jobs and revenues they generate.

        I support, therefore, the immediate revision of current export
controls over encryption devices to comport with the reality of worldwide
encryption availability.

        I believe law enforcement and the intelligence community would be
better served by finding real, and targeted ways to deal with international
terrorists and criminals rather than promoting scattershot policies, which
restrict American industries' ability to design, produce, and market
technology.

        Now -- more than ever -- we cannot afford to harm our economic
competitiveness and justify it in the name of National Security.


*****************************************************************************

-- 
Stanton McCandlish * mech@eff.org * Electronic Frontier Found. OnlineActivist
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