From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 10 Jun 94 22:48:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: "Persistent Institutions" (Re: Timed-Release Crypto)
Message-ID: <199406110549.WAA02906@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Here's the last of these articles I plan to forward. This one mentions the
"persistent institutions" idea (based on timed-release crypto mediated by
mutually suspicious agents) I have mentioned at times. (I need to do a
major piece on this, as my comments are mainly scattered in various
places.)

Dave Deltorto was asking about hardware failure of the host machines as a
practical concern and this is what I was initially responding to.

--Tim


>Date: Wed, 17 Feb 93 12:16:30 -0800
>To: cypherpunks@toad.com
>From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
>Subject: Re: Timed-Release Crypto
>
>Dave Deltorto writes (about my idea for timed-release crypto):
>
>>Well, yes, Tim, but what about the MTBF rating fo disk drives and or other
>>storage media? Any such message would also be relying on the turst that the
>>disk it's stored on, the mail system and or the organization it was sent to
>>for storgae are still going to be around. Now, if there were dedicated places
>
>Loss of hardware over the years due to unreliability is unlikely to be the
>main issue, for several reasons:
>
>1. Modern MTBFs for large disk drives are approaching 100,000 hours, or
>well over 10 years. The drives are likelier to be voluntarily retired
>first. And newer drives, including archival optical drives, are even more
>reliable (the  drives may crash, but optical media survive). For the drives
>that _do_ fail, backup strategies exist, as with all storage of critical
>files. To wit, if your point is correct, then the failures of some disk
>drives at banks, insurance companies, etc., should be producing some
>fraction of "unrecoverable losses" each year. That they are not, because of
>robust backup and redundant storage methods, is evidence that crypto time
>vaults will also be reasonably secure. (Granted, you wouldn't want to trust
>your $100,000 deposit for 20 years on Joe Random's aging Amiga 1000.)
>
>2. A relatively large file by today's standards, e.g., 10 megabytes, will
>be a very small file by the standards of 10 years from now. The upshot is
>that new and more reliable storage methods (and transmission methods) will
>make storage of such small files quite trivial. (And remember that since
>the pieces are encrypted, physical duplication for backups, redundant
>storage, etc., is not a compromise of security.)
>
>3. The most reputatable crypto time vaults will of course be careful not to
>lose client files, especially not for such mundane reasons as disk drive
>failures.
>
>4. M-out-of-n voting strategies are likely in any case, to deal with
>collusion of some of the nodes. That is, a file will be split into pieces
>such that any 8 out of 12 pieces, for example, are sufficient to recover
>the original file. (Encryption is a separate issue, though obviously
>related.)
>
>5. The files are likely to be moved around a lot, anyway, making hardware
>failures manageable on an instantaneous basis (that is, bad nodes, etc.,
>can be compensated for when the time comes to reroute the files). Thus, a
>critical file does not just get "parked" at one site for 30 years.
>
>>where such t-r crypto msgs could be stored, such as a digital "bank" (where
>>they would no doubt charge a storage fee, possibly necessitating that each
>>such msg would be able to "peel off" digicredits from itself every year to
>>guarantee paying for it's own upkeep in case you were no longer aropund to
>>sign checks), the question of whether or not it would BE there in 30 years
>>might be moot, but that's a whole 'nother discussion.
>
>"Persistent institutions" is what I call these systems or trusts that last
>for many decades. If such systems can be built, using some of the ideas
>discussed here in this group, then interesting new financial and political
>structures are possible. Imagine an anonymous, distributed trust that has
>$10 billion in crypto-assets and a "goal" of funding nanotech or cryonics
>research. (Lots of complicated stuff yet to be considered in enough detail
>on how such "goals" might be stored, acted on, etc. For the sake of
>simplicity, think of it as a kind of Howard Hughes Medical Foundation,
>which once owned the Hughes Corporation, but which is not located in any
>one single country....)
>
>>Still, I find your idea very compelling and full of merit.
>
>Thanks. Lots more work is needed.
>
>-Tim May
>
>
>--
>Timothy C. May               | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
>tcmay@netcom.com        | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
>408-688-5409               | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
>W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA       | black markets, collapse of governments.
>Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.
>
>

..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
"National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."