From: firstname.lastname@example.org (David Koontz )
Message Hash: aa50e30c720dfbb8f99e99e4a431ced137036f1d7b5f3f6ff8bce4d903655451
Message ID: <9406022349.AA18689@io.lrcs.loral.com>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1994-06-02 23:50:09 UTC
Raw Date: Thu, 2 Jun 94 16:50:09 PDT
From: email@example.com (David Koontz ) Date: Thu, 2 Jun 94 16:50:09 PDT To: firstname.lastname@example.org Subject: Spoofing Clipper Message-ID: <9406022349.AA18689@io.lrcs.loral.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain I had a fun idea. Imagine getting enough information together to spoof clipper transmissions? The idea being to disguise other types of secure transmissions as clipper ones. What would be needed would the escrow encryption identifer, a bunch of damaged LEAF/IV assemblies and a transmission channel that wouldn't be easily distinguishable from data portions of a clipper transmission. You start the channel up prepending one of a large number of spoofed LEAF/IV assemblies. With enough of these traversing the ether, the chaff/wheat noise ratio goes down to where having a source identifier (ID in the LEAF) gets real hit or miss - to where it loses traffic analysis value. Sort of growing weeds intentionally on the information superhighway.