1994-06-02 - Spoofing Clipper

Header Data

From: koontzd@lrcs.loral.com (David Koontz )
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: aa50e30c720dfbb8f99e99e4a431ced137036f1d7b5f3f6ff8bce4d903655451
Message ID: <9406022349.AA18689@io.lrcs.loral.com>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1994-06-02 23:50:09 UTC
Raw Date: Thu, 2 Jun 94 16:50:09 PDT

Raw message

From: koontzd@lrcs.loral.com (David Koontz )
Date: Thu, 2 Jun 94 16:50:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Spoofing Clipper
Message-ID: <9406022349.AA18689@io.lrcs.loral.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain

I had a fun idea.  Imagine getting enough information together to
spoof clipper transmissions?  The idea being to disguise other types
of secure transmissions as clipper ones. 

What would be needed would the escrow encryption identifer, a bunch of
damaged LEAF/IV assemblies and a transmission channel that wouldn't
be easily distinguishable from data portions of a clipper transmission.
You start the channel up prepending one of a large number of spoofed
LEAF/IV assemblies.  

With enough of these traversing the ether, the chaff/wheat noise ratio
goes down to where having a source identifier (ID in the LEAF) gets
real hit or miss - to where it loses traffic analysis value.  Sort of
growing weeds intentionally on the information superhighway.