1994-06-03 - Re: Black Eye for NSA, NIST, and Denning

Header Data

From: sidney@taurus.apple.com (Sidney Markowitz)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: b92087694dd33364b2b0684f39cca429591274de36d3415622ac9f1b5a5baad3
Message ID: <9406032242.AA29671@federal-excess.apple.com>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1994-06-03 22:43:46 UTC
Raw Date: Fri, 3 Jun 94 15:43:46 PDT

Raw message

From: sidney@taurus.apple.com (Sidney Markowitz)
Date: Fri, 3 Jun 94 15:43:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Black Eye for NSA, NIST, and Denning
Message-ID: <9406032242.AA29671@federal-excess.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain

DEADBEAT <na5877@anon.penet.fi> says:

>If one's objective is to use SKIPJACK but to defeat key
>escrow, pre-encryption is easier, conceptually simpler, and may be more

Right now, you need to arrange things with another party if you are going
to have secure communication. If Clipper catches on the way the government
wants, you may be able to assume that someone you want to contact has an
encryption device compatible with yours. If Blaze's hack can be used by the
initiator of a communication to defeat key escrow without the cooperation
or knowledge of the other person, then Clipper will have made it more
difficult for law inforcement, since then criminals and other people with
privacy concerns will be able to have secure communication with people who
are not part of their pre-arranged secure communications system. That, the
defeat of traffic analysis, and the avoidance of the attention one could
draw by using non-LEAFed encrypted traffic, are the advantages of Blaze's

 -- sidney <sidney@taurus.apple.com>