From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
To: 0005514706@mcimail.com (Michael Wilson)
Message Hash: 4793bc5173898d1cd61be5bdd45b418dd7749c09d9f402def17263367ab53fdb
Message ID: <199407022345.QAA11226@netcom5.netcom.com>
Reply To: <32940702225823/0005514706NA2EM@mcimail.com>
UTC Datetime: 1994-07-02 23:44:58 UTC
Raw Date: Sat, 2 Jul 94 16:44:58 PDT
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sat, 2 Jul 94 16:44:58 PDT
To: 0005514706@mcimail.com (Michael Wilson)
Subject: Re: 'Black' budget purchases
In-Reply-To: <32940702225823/0005514706NA2EM@mcimail.com>
Message-ID: <199407022345.QAA11226@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Michael Wilson writes:
> The data from the Maryland Procurement Office that is stored in certain
> databases (and removed from others, as I have just discovered when I checked)
> provides the complete 'black' budget purchases of the intelligence community,
> not just their purchases of supercomputers. Such raw data goes a long way
> towards confirming other bits of intelligence, such as the establishment by NSA
> of its own chip manufacturing facility owing to a lack of trust in undocumented
> sections of commercial silicon. This data is useful beyond knowing the numbers
That the NSA contracted National Semiconductor to build a facility
on-site has been common knowledge since 1989-90. The fab is not state
of the art (i.e., is not 1.8 micron or better) and is believed to be
used for the very reasonable purpose of producing keying material in a
secure environment (ROMs, PROMs, fuse-linked micros, PLAs, etc.). It
is unlikely--but possible--that high-performance micros are being
manufactured there.
> of supercomputers available (although it does help provide an upper boundary on
> raw processing power, useful for quantifying tolerances).
>
> What we find interesting regarding the number of supercomputers at NSA is what
> they do to the keyspace; a supposition of ours from the early period of
> commercial public key was an attack on the domain of potential keys. Given a
> known keylength, a powerful systematic search for primes that fit that range
> can, over time, begin to damage the strength of the system. Careful analysis of
This is nonsense. A typical 1024-bit RSA system uses p and q close to
512 bits each, e.g., 511 and 513. Whatever.
Now a 512-bit number is a 150-plus decimal digit number. About .5-1%
of all of these numbers are prime (by the Prime Number Theorem, or
somesuch...about 1/N of all N-digit numbers are prime, as I recall).
How big a keyspace is this to start searching "systematically"?
Considering that there are "only" about 10^73 particles of all kinds
in the entire universe (based on our best estimate of the size of the
universe, the density of galaxies, gas clouds, etc.), this means that
if every particle in the universe were searching for and recording the
primes they discovered, each particle would have to store 10^77
primes!
So much for "a powerful systematic search for primes that fit that
range."
> technical resource also allows one to speculate--are CM platforms (pardon the
> pun) used for exhaustive systematic search for keys, while Cray systems are used
> for attacks on the keyspace? Differentiation of parallel versus scalar
> processing towards attack domains is interesting.
"Parallel versus scalar processing"? Parallelism means nothing at
these scales...see the above point.
> Michael Wilson
> Managing Director, The Nemesis Group
> The Adversary
--Tim May
--
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay@netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
"National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."
Return to July 1994
Return to “tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)”