1994-07-27 - (None)

Header Data

From: Jeff Gostin <jgostin@eternal.pha.pa.us>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: 9dd41157522e3ba033ee2dad41ba7e4678734608a9245f55bf442df99dc51d1b
Message ID: <940726191522R6Qjgostin@eternal.pha.pa.us>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1994-07-27 00:12:04 UTC
Raw Date: Tue, 26 Jul 94 17:12:04 PDT

Raw message

From: Jeff Gostin <jgostin@eternal.pha.pa.us>
Date: Tue, 26 Jul 94 17:12:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: (None)
Message-ID: <940726191522R6Qjgostin@eternal.pha.pa.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal) writes:

> All sounds reasonble *except*... this is the internet, man!  We can afford
> to do this once every 15 minutes, can't we?
     Unless the messages are given a delivery latency of <insert random
time>, Traffic Analysis will allow for the tracking of messages. If, OTOH,
messages _are_ given a latency, but are garaunteed to be out of the
remailer in, say, 12 hours, it makes the task of tracking messages
anywhere from one degree more difficult to exponentially more difficult,
depending on how many messages flow in 12 hours. If you allow for dummy
messages to pad traffic, TA could be avoided almost entirely except by the
most anal of attackers.

                                        --jeff
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