From: nobody@kaiwan.com (Anonymous)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: 696f9f32970d9b8bf15c430c005748689bcafd6c19d7915db72a247cc06b14ad
Message ID: <199408120145.SAA23405@kaiwan.kaiwan.com>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1994-08-12 01:45:36 UTC
Raw Date: Thu, 11 Aug 94 18:45:36 PDT
From: nobody@kaiwan.com (Anonymous)
Date: Thu, 11 Aug 94 18:45:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Reailers: To Log or Not to Log?
Message-ID: <199408120145.SAA23405@kaiwan.kaiwan.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
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Tim May pondered:
> And even that last remailer may be able to claim ignorance (and win in
> court) if he can show that what he mailed was unreadable to him, i.e.,
> encrypted to the recipient. (This is another reason I favor a goal of
> "everyone a remailer.")
The only problem I see with the "everyone a remailer" concept is
that, in the presence of traffic analysis, a locally generated
message will show up as an imbalance between incoming and
outgoing messages, will it not?
> With canonical remailers, and no logging, earlier remailers should be
> safe.
That brings up an interesting point -- does the very act of
logging remailing activity, specifically the recording of sources
and destinations of forwarded messages perhaps open the operator
up to INCREASED liability? IOW, if the remailer is being used in
the furtherance of a "crime", the presence of a log which records
the details of such traffic might be used as an argument that the
operator "should have known" that suspicious, possibly illegal,
activity was going on and possibly being considerd CRIMINALLY
NEGLIGENT for not stopping it. Has he/she torpedoed any
possibility of a "Sgt. Schultz" ("I know nuuuuthing!") defense by
gathering detailed evidence and then not acting on it? Perhaps
"Don't ask, don't tell" is a better policy...
Also, I suspect that if increased activity on a remailer is
useful in thwarting traffic analysis, then foreswearing the
keeping of logs should serve to INCREASE the throughput as users
gain confidence that any "footprints" they might leave behind are
promptly erased.
-- Diogenes
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