1994-08-18 - Re: NSA Spy Machine and DES

Header Data

From: “Ian Farquhar” <ianf@simple.sydney.sgi.com>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: 9a1568319a99315d69694a95ccc37701aa090368d6b6b4ebecf38836d09714d0
Message ID: <9408190809.ZM4528@simple.sydney.sgi.com>
Reply To: <199408182034.AA16457@access3.digex.net>
UTC Datetime: 1994-08-18 22:12:46 UTC
Raw Date: Thu, 18 Aug 94 15:12:46 PDT

Raw message

From: "Ian Farquhar" <ianf@simple.sydney.sgi.com>
Date: Thu, 18 Aug 94 15:12:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: NSA Spy Machine and DES
In-Reply-To: <199408182034.AA16457@access3.digex.net>
Message-ID: <9408190809.ZM4528@simple.sydney.sgi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Aug 18,  4:41pm, Peter Wayner wrote:
> But let's give the NSA/SRC some credit. These new SIMD processors are
probably
> smarter. Let's say that they're  64 bit wide RISC machines which can only
> access their own local on chip memory. If they can run 2 times faster (100
> MHz) and do DES encryption in 1000 cycles, then this means that the brute
> force attack on DES could be done in 4 days. Bam.

Actually, I would be surprised if the "SIMD" processors were not a huge
array of reprogrammable FPGA's, quite possibly Xilinx's.  The possibilities
of a large array of these chips, each with local memory, is quite
interesting.  I have personally seen an array of 64 Xilinx chips in a DEC PeRL
box doing RSA, at speeds similar or better to almost all available custom
hardware implementations of the cipher.

BTW, with a purchase of half a million chips, economies of scale would get
the devices well within budget.

						Ian.








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