1994-08-03 - Re: Remailer traffic analysis foiling

Header Data

From: cjl <cjl@welchlink.welch.jhu.edu>
To: Jidan <yusuf921@raven.csrv.uidaho.edu>
Message Hash: b3e53cc68a2a9e81fcb664341510e29934590d8cfc8421a13a5022b46fc76c34
Message ID: <Pine.3.89.9408031701.A14476-0100000@welchlink.welch.jhu.edu>
Reply To: <Pine.3.87.9408031432.A17383-0100000@raven.csrv.uidaho.edu>
UTC Datetime: 1994-08-03 22:01:52 UTC
Raw Date: Wed, 3 Aug 94 15:01:52 PDT

Raw message

From: cjl <cjl@welchlink.welch.jhu.edu>
Date: Wed, 3 Aug 94 15:01:52 PDT
To: Jidan <yusuf921@raven.csrv.uidaho.edu>
Subject: Re: Remailer traffic analysis foiling
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.87.9408031432.A17383-0100000@raven.csrv.uidaho.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.89.9408031701.A14476-0100000@welchlink.welch.jhu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Since it was posted twice I guess I can reply twice :-)

On Wed, 3 Aug 1994, Jidan wrote:
> for total anon post/mail
> How workable is setting up remailers with psudo-cooperation
> so that when it recieves an anon mail it waits 20 or so min
> and then randomly sends copies of it to 5 other remailers of which
> the original reciever randomly decides which 1 of the 6 will post 
> and the rest simply discard. 
>   a 5 fold increase in traffic will make it harder to analize if
> 80% is just noise

This scheme wouldn't be workable in the currently fragile and ephemeral 
net of remailers.  They would have to spend a lot of time talking to each 
other and making sure that they all had up-to-date lists of valid 
remailers.  That's too much of a burden to put on the net.philanthropists
that are currently operating mailing lists.

Any validation of a chained remailer pathway is up to the user (not 
exactly *caveat emptor* cause you ain't paying for anything, but you get 
the idea)

 
C. J. Leonard                     (    /      "DNA is groovy"
                                   \ /                - Watson & Crick
<cjl@welchlink.welch.jhu.edu>      / \     <--  major groove
                                  (    \
Finger for public key               \   )
Strong-arm for secret key             /    <--  minor groove
Thumb-screws for pass-phrase        /   )




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