1994-08-16 - Re: In Search of Genuine DigiCash

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From: jim@bilbo.suite.com (Jim Miller)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: c8f29b75e72e440a30f6f3a99c8eb36846078fd35542a1f9e6add4facd177a71
Message ID: <9408161813.AA00935@bilbo.suite.com>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1994-08-16 18:14:43 UTC
Raw Date: Tue, 16 Aug 94 11:14:43 PDT

Raw message

From: jim@bilbo.suite.com (Jim Miller)
Date: Tue, 16 Aug 94 11:14:43 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: In Search of Genuine DigiCash
Message-ID: <9408161813.AA00935@bilbo.suite.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




> "The proliferation of desktop publishing has brought a
> new  growth industry, the counterfeiting of virtually
> undetectable  fraudulent checks, and banks and law
> enforcement officials say  the cost to the economy could
> reach $1 billion this year.
> 

> * * *
> 

> The American Banking Association says [this] is the No. 1
> crime  problem facing banks. 

> 


This bring to mind the following question:  Is there anything inherent in  
NON-anonymous digital cash schemes that make them more vulnerable to  
fraud, bribery or inside jobs?   (I assume the schemes account for double  
spending and "counterfeiting" (however that applies to digicash).)

Can a case be made that anonymous digicash is less risky (to a bank) than  
NON-anonymous digicash?


Jim_Miller@suite.com






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