1994-08-29 - e$: e-cash underwriting

Header Data

From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: ee78f531dd5c2cf9f96a4dc054aee81af127d6e73f4961fa1045b4f52d964012
Message ID: <9408290509.AA28256@ah.com>
Reply To: <199408280514.BAA15326@zork.tiac.net>
UTC Datetime: 1994-08-29 06:32:18 UTC
Raw Date: Sun, 28 Aug 94 23:32:18 PDT

Raw message

From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Sun, 28 Aug 94 23:32:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: e$: e-cash underwriting
In-Reply-To: <199408280514.BAA15326@zork.tiac.net>
Message-ID: <9408290509.AA28256@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain

   >Why does everyone think that the law must immediately be invoked when
   >double spending is detected?

   It's obvious I gave that impression. I regret the error. 

I wasn't referring just to you, but to what is unfortunately and
surprisingly a general reaction to protocol failure in money
protocols, namely, "lynch the bastard!".  I assure you, as recently
as last week I had the same reaction from someone at DigiCash.

Anyone remember the rant of mine a few months back about language and
about how imputing motive into protocol makes you stupid?  Well,
here's a good example of that connection in action.  The dominant term
in the literature for the agent of double-spending is a "cheater".
And cheaters must not prosper, right, so let's punish them.  That kind
of reasoning leads without further thought to a reliance on law
enforcement and identity.

   If someone deliberately double (or million) spends, then they should get
   busted for fraud. Period.  

If there's a charge for attempting a deposit, and this charge is paid,
even a million times, do you still think such transactions should be
considered fraud?

Turn fraud attempts from a security cost to a profit center.