1994-09-21 - Re: On the crime bill and remailers

Header Data

From: frissell@panix.com (Duncan Frissell)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: 299673a65d983e2e89872b4b999ead788840db67e2649b5b9337d85cd4dd217a
Message ID: <199409211111.AA08391@panix.com>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1994-09-21 11:12:13 UTC
Raw Date: Wed, 21 Sep 94 04:12:13 PDT

Raw message

From: frissell@panix.com (Duncan Frissell)
Date: Wed, 21 Sep 94 04:12:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: On the crime bill and remailers
Message-ID: <199409211111.AA08391@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At 05:45 PM 9/20/94 -0400, John Young wrote:

>Hal and Tim point to the vulnerability of the person running 
>the remailer to being threatened through the equipment owner 

Soon most remailers will be run on equipment owned by the operator.  At the
last NJ computer show I attended, I could have purchased a 486/66 with a
paltry 250 meg HD for $999.  Then all we have to worry about are the network
connections but in a few years, we'll be able to do high-speed "dial up"
connections from our home boxes to other (and different) systems anywhere on
the nets.  Hard to track.

>This isolation and elimination (or co-optation) of a target has 
>worked again and again to destroy networks once they become 
>serious threats to law and order.

They can afford to intimidate a few remailers but "enforcement doesn't scale
well."  (Another DCF quote.)  Networks, software, and hardware scale much
better than enforcement resources.  Swamping effect.

DCF






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