From: Black Unicorn <unicorn@access.digex.net>
Date: Thu, 22 Sep 94 10:03:04 PDT
To: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Subject: Re: On the crime bill and remailers
In-Reply-To: <9409201556.AA17067@ah.com>
Message-ID: <199409221701.AA02407@access1.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Eric Hughes scripsit
> 
>    Black Unicorn <unicorn@access.digex.net> writes:
>    >But they are so targeted to prevent GOVERNMENT 
>    >observation and intercepts, that they just plain look bad.
> 
>    I strongly disagree with this.  Anonymous remailers as presently constructed
>    will be almost completely ineffective against any significant government
>    attempts to surveil email traffic.
> 
> Is this the national security part of government, or the law
> enforcement part of government?  Certainly the national security
> apparatus has the technical means to defeat the current remailers,
> but does the FBI or (even more unlikely) the local cops?
> 
> True, the FBI could ask for a data tap on the connections to a
> remailer, but they would have to know how to do it, first, and in any
> case it would be very expensive.  Compatible remailers spanning the
> globe could be argued evidence of an attempt to thwart law enforcement
> access by internationalization.  Certainly remailers hinder law
> enforcement, if not actually prevent it.

While I agree that remailers could eventually, if not already deter the 
local cops, and perhaps even federal enforcement, my point was more 
design goal, not current capability.  This distinction is likely to be 
lost in any court proceedings, or in any FISA proceeding.  Again, it 
means nothing that remailers do or do not have the capability to deter 
this or that kind of attacker, but that they are not intentionally 
crippled to allow government circumvention.

If I use a scanner to listen to police activity while committing a crime, 
and such an offense is an obstruction charge in my jurisdiction, does it 
matter that I was a moron and that I had it tuned to the wrong channel, 
and was caught?

What if the scanner was too primitive to deal with the new 800 MHZ police 
band?  Am I still guilty?  What if I was using it to listen to the 
weather forecast so the stolen flour wouldn't be rained on?

Isn't it obvious that the judge will take a dim view of ALL these examples?

In this context isn't it important to examine these possibilities as if 
they are a threat with an eye toward addressing them and making remailers 
immune to this type of argument?

> 
> And in the end, it's a court that decides, not a military tribunal.
> Uni's argument is worth examining and does not fall down on its face.
> 

Why thank you Mr. Hughes!  :)

> Eric
> 

-uni- (Dark)

-- 
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6E6D4506F6EDBC17 quaere verum ad infinitum, loquitur sub rosa    -    wichtig!