1994-09-19 - Re: RSADSI vs. Remailers (Meta Strong Crypto)

Header Data

From: Andrew Brown <a.brown@nexor.co.uk>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: db32c73a0732ee7e4e225e96f04106fe2dd11072b7b4457b074e3bcda4b2b65f
Message ID: <Pine.3.89.9409190917.A19693-0100000@vulcan.nexor.co.uk>
Reply To: <aaa0ae0211021003a121@[198.232.141.2]>
UTC Datetime: 1994-09-19 08:41:26 UTC
Raw Date: Mon, 19 Sep 94 01:41:26 PDT

Raw message

From: Andrew Brown <a.brown@nexor.co.uk>
Date: Mon, 19 Sep 94 01:41:26 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: RSADSI vs. Remailers (Meta Strong Crypto)
In-Reply-To: <aaa0ae0211021003a121@[198.232.141.2]>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.89.9409190917.A19693-0100000@vulcan.nexor.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Sat, 17 Sep 1994, Doug Cutrell wrote:

> [...] 
> It still might
> be possible to have anonymous remailers operating safely outside the
> borders of the country -- but it would be possible to monitor for traffic
> *destined* for these remailers, leaving the country.  Since no anonymous
> remailers exist within the country, the origin of this traffic can be
> determined, and the sources can be prosecuted for use of an anonymous
> remailer.

Perhaps not.  The US user could send an encrypted message to a foreign
machine that offers, say, 100 different services, including a remailing
service.  You could not prove that the sender had requested a remailing
and thus he could not be prosecuted.  You could even randomly invoke one
of the other services whenever a remail is requested.   Other services 
might include ftpmail, archie searches etc...

- Andy

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