From: nobody@cass156.ucsd.edu (Anonymous)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: dd7372249fae969a35f169e30ff35f0982e496aebfbc6368c3ccf10117a9b606
Message ID: <9409281514.AA19526@nately.UCSD.EDU>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1994-09-28 15:11:23 UTC
Raw Date: Wed, 28 Sep 94 08:11:23 PDT
From: nobody@cass156.ucsd.edu (Anonymous)
Date: Wed, 28 Sep 94 08:11:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: re: SUFFERANCE remailers
Message-ID: <9409281514.AA19526@nately.UCSD.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Samuel Kaplin writes:
>How about locating it in a recalcitrant country e.g. North Korea, Libya,
>Iraq, Iran. During the Gulf war scuttlebutt has it that Iraq used encrypted
>communications on the Internet to keep its C3 functions up. (Command,
>Control, Communications) If they can't get at the remailer its pretty hard
>to shut it down.
Breakdown writes:
>Hm, aren't European remailers something "like" Fortress remailers? The
>State surely doesn't require consent for anon.penet.fi or such and no one
>in the US(well I hope no one) knows the physical location of it... And
>you can post just about anything through that one :)....
Hmm. Unfortunately I think we're missing the point here. Perhaps a
redefinition of SUFFERANCE REMAILERS... A SUFFERANCE REMAILER is remailer
which exists only so long as *any* government, organization, person(s) does
not decide (for whatever reasons) to shut it down, outlaw it, etc.
Firstly, a remailer which is not directly vunerable to the U.S.'s "gun
argument" may still be vunerable to any other country's gun argument;
information is power, and no State may be trusted to act in our best
interest insofar as information and communication are concerned.
Secondly, sing the *placement* of a remailer in a recalcitrant country as
the only means of defense against U.S. legislation will pretty much insure
that the remailer's general location will, sooner or later, become a
military target; whereas the remailer's location makes it *indirectly*
vunerable to the U.S.'s "gun argument," the very fact that it is accessible
by U.S. citizens makes it *directly* vunerable to the U.S. military
machine. (Again, this is using on placement as a means of defense against
any U.S. legislation.)
And this brings up point C...
It would not only be necessary to legislate against remailers, but would be
necessary to legislate against *access* to remailers. This is what I
imagine would happen.
Lastly, Dave Merriman writes:
[snip]
>into a sealed room with umpteen bajillion other identical links
[snip}
Umpteen is spelled with an 'h.' ;)
>> SUFFERANCE REMAILERS
>>
>> Definition of SUFFERANCE REMAILER: A remailer that exists only so
>>long as the U.S. Feds get around to outlawing it.; a sitting duck
>>remailer. ; a remailer whose physical location may easily be found.;
>>a remailer whose operator is vulnerable to the State's gun argument.;
>>currently, the only kind of remailer there is.
>>
>> Definition of FORTRESS REMAILER: A remailer whose physical location
>>cannot be found. ; a remailer that does not require the consent of
>>the State. ; a Freedom remailer.
Feeling a little Detweiler today....
_/_/_/ _/_/_/ _/ _/ _/_/_/ _/ _/ I detest what you write,
_/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/_/ _/ but I would give my life
_/_/_/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/_/_/ _/ _/ _/ to make it possible for
_/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/_/_/_/ _/ you to continue to write.
_/_/_/ _/_/_/ _/_/_/ _/_/_/ _/ _/ _/_/_/ --Voltaire
_/ (in a letter to M. le Riche)
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1994-09-28 (Wed, 28 Sep 94 08:11:23 PDT) - re: SUFFERANCE remailers - nobody@cass156.ucsd.edu (Anonymous)