From: Carl Ellison <cme@tis.com>
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 15:16:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: overload of the term "Key Escrow"
Message-ID: <9410052215.AA13811@tis.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



There has been much discussion since at least 1992, but especially since
April 1993, under the general heading of ``Key Escrow''.  This term has
been severely overloaded in the process, to the point that the term has no
trustworthy meaning.  What is worse, this overloading is almost certainly
because there are topics which are politically sensitive involved and there
is a reticence to express these topics openly.

It is my intention to bring all of these topics into the open and discuss
them, giving them each a label which we can use instead of the poor
overloaded "Key Escrow".

My list so far includes:
 export and intelligence access
	(NSA wants <= 40 bits to crunch on any alg shipped overseas)
 law enforcement access
	(FBI wants all cleartext, for everything, everywhere;
	failing that, it wants keys; and all have to be delivered
	to some comfortable central listening post)
 ?voluntary? compliance
    The Administration says "voluntary" but does it want:
	 user voluntary,
	 manufacturer voluntary + user mandatory,
	or mandatory ?


Are there any other issues hidden behind the term "key escrow" which gov't
people don't talk about that anyone thinks I should bring out in the open?

Please reply by direct e-mail.  

Thanks,


 - Carl