From: norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy)
To: Alex Strasheim <cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: 1285f04d1ce0f184b87dcbbc2a6f154e54d268d05bba3b7971635607c394e4dc
Message ID: <aaffa3550002100432fd@DialupEudora>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1994-11-28 17:07:31 UTC
Raw Date: Mon, 28 Nov 94 09:07:31 PST
From: norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy)
Date: Mon, 28 Nov 94 09:07:31 PST
To: Alex Strasheim <cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Transparent Email (WAS disable telnet to port 25)
Message-ID: <aaffa3550002100432fd@DialupEudora>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
At 1:34 AM 11/28/94, Alex Strasheim wrote:
....
>The big problem with transparent encryption and signatures is key
>distribution: if you've never sent a letter to me, your mailer will have
>to get my key (invisibly) before the mail can be sent. The big problem
>with key distribution is the web of trust: who gets to decide which keys
>are good?
....
If I have never sent you mail, consider how I got your e-mail address?
You could have sent your public key to me along with your e-mail address.
If your public key is too big you could include a phoneticized secure hash of
your public key and I could check big brother (the CA). I suspect that initial
bits of a public key serve pretty well as a secure hash. Perhaps all email
addresses should be accompanied by such a hash. The more initial bits
the harder to find a fake public key with sutiable mathematical properties
and initial bits that agree with your real pulic key.
If an email address and its associated PK are sent thru unauthenticated
channels a man in the middle can substitute the PK. In the same situation,
however, the man in the middle can substitute the email address!
....
Return to November 1994
Return to “norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy)”