1994-12-15 - Re: properties of FV

Header Data

From: Nathaniel Borenstein <nsb@nsb.fv.com>
To: Andrew Lowenstern <andrew_loewenstern@il.us.swissbank.com>
Message Hash: 050645ec189a744de6c55fe78956be737ad9a13adf92bc1a3f2436797c1f2714
Message ID: <IiwA2wz0Eyt5Err2Es@nsb.fv.com>
Reply To: <16267.787529765.1@nsb.fv.com>
UTC Datetime: 1994-12-15 22:20:48 UTC
Raw Date: Thu, 15 Dec 94 14:20:48 PST

Raw message

From: Nathaniel Borenstein <nsb@nsb.fv.com>
Date: Thu, 15 Dec 94 14:20:48 PST
To: Andrew Lowenstern <andrew_loewenstern@il.us.swissbank.com>
Subject: Re: properties of FV
In-Reply-To: <16267.787529765.1@nsb.fv.com>
Message-ID: <IiwA2wz0Eyt5Err2Es@nsb.fv.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Excerpts from fv: 15-Dec-94 Re: properties of FV Andrew
Lowenstern@il.us. (718*)

> >  This goes back to the two kinds of anonymity that you so usefully
> >  defined in your earlier message.  These small transactions would
> >  have counterparty anonymity -- all that the seller knows is your
> >  first virtual id, which is essentially a user-chosen pseudonym --
> >  but not issuer anonymity.

> That would make this counterparty pseudonymity, not anonymity.  The merchant,  
> while not knowing the true identity of his clients, is still able to  
> correlate the transactions of individual accounts (and must be able to under  
> FV's policies).  A malicious merchant, for instance, could recognize that a  
> particular account is more interested in certain types of information and  
> charge accordingly.

Good point.  I stand corrected, at least as far as the terminology is
concerned.   However, as far as the particular malicious-merchant
scenario is concerned, I must say I'd be skeptical about any merchant
who didn't tell me the price up front, *before* he asked me for my
account-id...  -- Nathaniel






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