1994-12-03 - MIT Keysigner CA

Header Data

From: Christian Odhner <cdodhner@PrimeNet.Com>
To: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Message Hash: 544d58d1b8dfca55fa7c6c81502f527345ba1e40fd57094851418586bf134d01
Message ID: <Pine.BSI.3.90.941202225621.21048D-100000@usr2.primenet.com>
Reply To: <9412021926.AA19667@toxicwaste.media.mit.edu>
UTC Datetime: 1994-12-03 06:04:15 UTC
Raw Date: Fri, 2 Dec 94 22:04:15 PST

Raw message

From: Christian Odhner <cdodhner@PrimeNet.Com>
Date: Fri, 2 Dec 94 22:04:15 PST
To: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Subject: MIT Keysigner CA
In-Reply-To: <9412021926.AA19667@toxicwaste.media.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.BSI.3.90.941202225621.21048D-100000@usr2.primenet.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Fri, 2 Dec 1994, Derek Atkins wrote:

> everyone to sign everyone else's key.  We plan to make the MIT
> Keysigner key widely distributed, and ask that everyone trust that key
> to sign other keys.

It seems strange that people would be expected to trust a key to sign 
other keys, just because somebody (even Derek, whom I have a measure of 
respect for) asked them to. I trust a key to be an introducer if and when 
I am sure that a signature by that key means that the signed key belongs 
to the identity (be it "real" or a 'nym) it claims to represent. 
Authentication via Kerbie may or may not indicate this. Such a signature 
would give some information that I might use to make decisions on whether 
or not to trust the new key, but it certainly would not be trusted if it 
was the only signature. 

Happy Hunting, -Chris.

______________________________________________________________________________
Christian Douglas Odhner     | "The NSA can have my secret key when they pry
cdodhner@primenet.com	     | it from my cold, dead, hands... But they shall
pgp 2.3 public key by finger | NEVER have the password it's encrypted with!"
cypherpunks         WOw            dCD           Traskcom          Team Stupid
  Key fingerprint =  58 62 A2 84 FD 4F 56 38  82 69 6F 08 E4 F1 79 11 
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