1994-12-13 - Anonymous Repository

Header Data

From: Tony.Gurnick@nzdairy.co.nz (DNA)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: e793b882ca87964328cabc6af022c553c24a377cc8a95a1b24ec88d3ec7068fe
Message ID: <94121314474992@nzdairy.co.nz>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1994-12-13 01:58:41 UTC
Raw Date: Mon, 12 Dec 94 17:58:41 PST

Raw message

From: Tony.Gurnick@nzdairy.co.nz (DNA)
Date: Mon, 12 Dec 94 17:58:41 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Anonymous Repository
Message-ID: <94121314474992@nzdairy.co.nz>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To solve anonymous replys heres a little scenario.


Alice wants something from bob (crypto?) but dosent want bob to know
(or any others (NSA?)) to know.

1) Alice sends a request to bob via and anon-remailer chain.

2) In the request she specifiys that bob is to put a special code
   in the message and send it to anon-repostiory@nowhere.com

3) Bob sends the info + the special code,
   for whatever reason.  (Payment recieved?)

4) Alice sends a message to anon-repostiory@nowhere.com saying to
   copy bobs message (using special code) to a new secret special
   code (here code represents a file name)
   - This message could/should be encrypted and the repository
     should delete it after the copy is made.


5) At some indetermined time in the future alice ftp`s or sends a mail
   message to anon-repostiory@nowhere.com and retrives bobs message.

This should defeat traffic analysis but will do nothing if the repository
is compromised!  But the same goes for anon-remailers.


There are huge blanks in this, so does anyone want to comment?



		T







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