1994-12-11 - Broadcasts and the Rendezvous Problem

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From: cactus@seabsd.hks.net (L. Todd Masco)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: f6f316ae334edcf3a024356c55310c30eca62356b801fd81c958441ce6297862
Message ID: <199412112203.RAA24716@bb.hks.net>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1994-12-11 21:58:13 UTC
Raw Date: Sun, 11 Dec 94 13:58:13 PST

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From: cactus@seabsd.hks.net (L. Todd Masco)
Date: Sun, 11 Dec 94 13:58:13 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Broadcasts and the Rendezvous Problem
Message-ID: <199412112203.RAA24716@bb.hks.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


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Seems to me that one of the fundamental building blocks necessary to
a host of anonymous services is a means of rendezvousing in a manner that
is not vulnerable to traffic analysis.

The obvious solution to this is through the use of a broadcast medium.
Has anybody created an alt.* group purely for remailer-associated
rendezvous?

If not, it seems like that would be a very worthwhile direction to pursue:
with such a mechanism, nodes of a "remailer net" can surface and disappear
with minimal disruption to the net.

Folks spend a lot of time bemoaning the transience of specific instances
of remailer nodes: why not turn this into an advantage by architecting
a network of system that is resilient against the destruction and/or
compromise of individual nodes?
- -- 
Todd Masco     | "'When _I_ use a word,' Humpty-Dumpty said, in a rather
cactus@hks.net |  scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean -
cactus@bb.com  |  neither more nor less.'"   - Lewis Carroll
- ---
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