1995-01-18 - Re: Another problem w/Data Havens…

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From: Ben.Goren@asu.edu
To: grendel@netaxs.com
Message Hash: 1c56eeed30bcd7f2f0a7e9750deb68e9d1d76aca026e69017ee2e3425be180af
Message ID: <v02110104ab420ae6be90@[129.219.97.131]>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1995-01-18 00:05:30 UTC
Raw Date: Tue, 17 Jan 95 16:05:30 PST

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From: Ben.Goren@asu.edu
Date: Tue, 17 Jan 95 16:05:30 PST
To: grendel@netaxs.com
Subject: Re: Another problem w/Data Havens...
Message-ID: <v02110104ab420ae6be90@[129.219.97.131]>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At 4:43 PM 1/17/95, Paul J. Ste. Marie wrote:
>At 03:29 AM 1/17/95 EST, bill.stewart@pleasantonca.ncr.com +1-510-484-6204
>wrote:
>> ... That way, Dave's system really only has knowledge of the headers,
>>plus one line at a time of incriminating data on the fly. ...
>
>I don't see exactly what that is buying Dave.  The entire contents were
>still transmitted to him, so the ability to see the entire file was still
>present, which means he could have, had he chosen to do so, prevented the
>file from residing on his system, and could have screened it.  It's
>essentially only the word of the haven op that shows he didn't examine the
>entire file.

That's the main reason why I like my idea of having a trusted encryptor.
Nobody's suggested that the current timestamp operators would be in Deep
Doo-Doo if they timestampped some piece of thoughtcrime; why should
somebody who encrypts be any different?

The service could even be advertised as a different form of timestamping
(or notarizing). Not only do you get the file back signed, but you get it
back encrypted and signed.

>    --Paul J. Ste. Marie
>      pstemari@well.sf.ca.us, pstemari@erinet.com

b&

--
Ben.Goren@asu.edu, Arizona State University School of Music
 Finger ben@tux.music.asu.edu for PGP public key ID 0x875B059.







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