From: craig@passport.ca (Craig Hubley)
Date: Thu, 19 Jan 95 01:48:32 PST
To: yusuf921@uidaho.edu (Syed Yusuf)
Subject: Re: FBI and BLACKNET
In-Reply-To: <Pine.HPP.3.91.950118195153.6655E-100000@goshawk.csrv.uidaho.edu>
Message-ID: <m0rUtU0-0002GhC@forged.passport.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> On Tue, 17 Jan 1995, Craig Hubley (I) wrote:
> 
> > Regarding BlackNet, I am not sure that they are not *run* by the FBI,
> > or NSA, or CIA, MI6, Interpol, or some more mysterious quasi-governmental 
> > entity. 
> 
> The more I think about it the more this theory makes sense. I know 
> how they _could_ have traced me but this doesn't explain all their other
> "leads" they are following up on and he seemed to imply there were many.
> 
> >>> Not to mention entrapment is their MO. <<<
> 
> What do you say we put the word out?

Mixed feelings.  On the one hand, I am starting to believe in this theory
more and more.  On the other hand, I think that having a BlackNet run by
security agencies is actually a stabilizing thing to some degree:  those
who are foolish enough to deal with unknown parties with unknown interests
in arbitrary secrets with petty motives will generally become neutralized.
For instance, those who sell 2000 credit card numbers or 500 broken Digital
Cash Card readouts (is this possible) can be paid or prosecuted at leisure.

In either case, such folks will find more and more security holes plugged
as they clearly identify where they are for the security agencies... this
would prevent a general crackdown on cryptography etc., effectively the
security agencies would have learned to work 'within the new realities'.

I suspect targets might be less likely to be chosen by police discretion,
and more likely to be chosen for their threat value, if they required less
(discretionary) effort to investigate in the first place.  Note that some
laws, like small scale marijuana growing, often go unenforced unless there
is a specific complaint or hard evidence is directly presented to police.
In the 'BlackNet sting', such a flow of evidence would be constantly on its
way in to the police, probably forcing them into more of a reactive mode,
and definitely focusing their attention on those actively peddling secrets
as opposed to those just trying to keep them.  Not too bad for privacy.

Furthermore, the flow of truly scary secrets flowing their way might make
them ration their effort to plug leaks of high priority:  nuclear weapon
design, biological warfare blueprints, formulae for putting necrotizing
fascitis into the common cold protein coat, 'gray goo' nanotechnology...
and other things that constitute serious threats to life on this planet.
This might probably divert effort away from prosecuting 'victimless crime',
enhancing civil liberties. For once such agencies might be 'doing their job'.
If indeed they have any legitimate job, which is always up for debate.

Of course they will also engage in petty prosecution of those who they
perceive are acting against their narrow interests, but all organisms
act to preserve and advance themselves... this comes and goes with their
leaders (J. Edgar Hoover, William Casey come to mind as good/bad examples)
who hopefully turn over with the tide of politics, minimizing the abuses
in the long run.  Of course this is little consolation to those they target.
Systematic abuses might be more easily revealed by 'whistleblowers' if there
were a clear record kept 'inside' of which leads were followed and which not.

Blow the whistle?  Sure, we could.  But what difference does it make?  If
no one trusts BlackNets, then the security agencies just take a different
route to building up credibility for a 'sting', using more private means,
or many such more private means, and again we increase their discretionary
powers as they decide where to devote effort to building up a reputation
(hmm do we target Columbian druglords?  biohackers?  breakaway republics?
cryptographers?) and thereby where to concentrate enforcement.  Perhaps by
blowing a whistle on a 'BlackNet sting' we simply force them to evolve to
more devious methods, that require more planning, and costs more (thus maybe
reducing their overall activity - although history says otherwise) but in
the long run is even more directed by the interest/prejudice of leaders.  It
may be that the simpler and more reactive the methods they apply, the better.
It is largely premeditated human scheming that starts wars, isn't it?  Not
simple knee jerks.  Perhaps others believe otherwise, but not really an issue
for debate in cypherpunks.

Perhaps it is better to co-opt agencies by giving them a reason to adopt
the cryptographer's agenda.  It's got to be cheaper and easier for them
to sit and buy secrets than it is to go out and dig them up themselves...
and cryptography generally advances that capability as folks feel safe
using it to transmit secrets electronically.  

Of course the idea that black nets must be a sting is speculation, but
it would hardly be the first time that security agencies and those that
they officially target had developed a symbiotic relationship.  Here in
Canada it was recently revealed that CSIS (the 'Canadian CIA') had been
actively involved in the founding of the Heritage Front, a neo-Nazi group.
In fact one of their leaders was an agent!  Interestingly, this appears 
to be a more effective/cheaper way to control a large group of otherwise
dangerous people - if they want to follow a leader, let them!  Just make
sure the leader is someone you control and you can prevent things from
getting too far out of hand.  Which is the only time that CSIS or the CIA
should be stepping in anyway.  It is sort of a pre-emptive strike and not
at all 'politically correct' in a liberal democracy, but they do it anyway.

That's life.  And maybe it's easier to keep an eye on simple forms of life.

Craig Hubley                Business that runs on knowledge
Craig Hubley & Associates   needs software that runs on the Web
craig@passport.ca   416-778-6136  416-778-1965 FAX