From: Brad Dolan <bdolan@use.usit.net>
Date: Wed, 18 Jan 95 18:32:30 PST
To: Ben.Goren@asu.edu
Subject: Re: Another problem w/Data Havens...
In-Reply-To: <v02110100ab435e5f6310@[129.219.97.131]>
Message-ID: <Pine.SOL.3.90.950118212506.8708C-100000@use.usit.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
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I'm not familiar with all aspects of this but one thing argues in favor
of hoping this becomes a test case:  Scientologists are probably more out of 
favor than cypherpunks.  

Brad


On Wed, 18 Jan 1995 Ben.Goren@asu.edu wrote:

> At 4:33 PM 1/18/95, Paul J. Ste. Marie wrote:
> >[. . .] As long as
> >some piece of info is considered to be a thought-crime, everyone who accepts
> >info from a wide range of sources is at risk.
> 
> We might have a test case right now for part of that idea--the
> Scientologists. They're essentially claiming that the various newsgroups
> should be shut down because somebody put thoughtcrime on them. I would
> posit that the operator of any automated data transmission/massaging
> service is not responsible for the data that passes through her equipment.
> Consider, for example, if I used a bang path to route an illicit email note
> through, say, apple.com. Does that make Apple Computer responsible for what
> I send?
> 
> Tying in with some of Eric's comments, this could be viewed as a
> fundamental flaw in the 'net: it's the sender, generally, who initiates and
> controls the connection, not the recipient. We could view this as an
> advantage: how can you blame me for what somebody else does to my computer
> without my knowledge, especially if I have no way to stop it short of
> getting off the 'net completely?
> 
> >> ... The service could even be advertised as a different form of timestamping
> >>(or notarizing). Not only do you get the file back signed, but you get it
> >>back encrypted and signed. ...
> >
> >That would still be a useful service, however, but it does transfer the risk
> >from the DH operator to the encryptor.  Since he isn't leaving evidence on a
> >hard drive, his window of vunerability is somewhat less.
> 
> Less to nonexistent. If no human sees it on the encrypting site, no human
> can be responsible for it. "They" would have to ban the service outright,
> or try to prove that you knew that your site would be used for illicit
> purposes. If putting a warning to not export crypto software on an ftp site
> is sufficient protection--and, judging from the number of sites which do no
> more than that, it is--then a simple statement that the service is not to
> be used for any illegal purpose should do fine here.
> 
> >    --Paul J. Ste. Marie
> >      pstemari@well.sf.ca.us, pstemari@erinet.com
> 
> b&
> 
> --
> Ben.Goren@asu.edu, Arizona State University School of Music
>  Finger ben@tux.music.asu.edu for PGP public key ID 0x875B059.
> 
> 
>