From: Greg Broiles <greg@ideath.goldenbear.com>
Date: Fri, 20 Jan 95 23:44:39 PST
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: Remailers-in-a-box
In-Reply-To: <199501210301.TAA09022@netcom14.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199501210401.AA02848@ideath.goldenbear.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


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> I don't think "disingenuous" as very apt description. For one thing,
> my proposal certainly doesn't make things any _worse_ for the true
> remailers. 

Sorry if I was unclear; I didn't mean that you were being disingenuous,
just that the assignment of responsibility/culpability in at least 
some of the schemes being discussed looks suspect to me.

I do think that this plan can create greater risk for the owners of
machines which operate remailers - what if one of their customers 
decides not to block traffic to whitehouse.gov, or to
alt.religion.copyright, or whatever? Neither the SPA nor the Secret
Service has acted particularly cluefully with respect to seizing
hardware or conducting unnanounced destructive "fishing" expeditions.
As things stand today, I have some control (via my filter list) of
the risks I'm willing to assume and not assume. If I let people with
no real stake in the matter gamble with my machine based on their own
choices about filtering, that looks like a loss to me.

(Of course, the machine owner can always, via contract, set certain
terms - e.g., addresses which must be filtered. This starts to look
like active participation in the administration of the remailer, which
makes the off-site operator structure seem less legitimate.)


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