From: Carl Ellison <cme@TIS.COM>
Date: Sat, 15 Jul 95 10:30:43 PDT
To: bal@martigny.ai.mit.edu
Subject: Re: Anti-Electronic Racketeering Act of 1995 (fwd)
Message-ID: <9507151728.AA15916@tis.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
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>Date: Fri, 14 Jul 95 21:28:27 -0400
>From: "Brian A. LaMacchia" <bal@martigny.ai.mit.edu>
>Subject: Re: Anti-Electronic Racketeering Act of 1995 (fwd)
>
>   >       `(c) It shall be an affirmative defense to prosecution under this
>   >     section that the software at issue used a universal decoding device
>   >     or program that was provided to the Department of Justice prior to
>   >     the distribution.'.
>
>   This isn't escrowed encryption being allowed here.  This is straight giving
>   of keys (or a back door) to the gov't.  Even Clipper fails this test.
>
>Why doesn't GAK satisfy this clause?

[...]  

>
>I don't see how Clipper fails the 1030A(c) test, except possibly for the
>fact that the proposed escrow agents were not both within DOJ.  I think
>that's a minor point.

Sorry.  That's the minor point I was talking about.

For example, one might make an exportable system by doing something really
nice for the gov't and giving NSA a back door master key for it to use.
That doesn't give it to the DoJ -- and I'm not so sure NSA would admit to
the existence of a back door much less release the master key.

 - Carl