From: “P.J. Ponder” <ponder@wane-leon-mail.scri.fsu.edu>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: e929f75526e0675dc49459f17011a071fc67ee1a04fc695bbe8100c8277c256f
Message ID: <Pine.3.89.9508292354.C13222-0100000@wane3.scri.fsu.edu>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1995-08-30 03:53:27 UTC
Raw Date: Tue, 29 Aug 95 20:53:27 PDT
From: "P.J. Ponder" <ponder@wane-leon-mail.scri.fsu.edu>
Date: Tue, 29 Aug 95 20:53:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: SSL brute/ng
Message-ID: <Pine.3.89.9508292354.C13222-0100000@wane3.scri.fsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
If anyone is putting together a wish list of features for the next
iteration of the distributed brute would they like to consider some sort
of mirroring approach for the server (at least on stats or updates/
software ) so that some of that traffic could be reduced? I'm afraid I
am one of the guilty trying to log on to check on the stats at least once
and I probably contributed to choking it just by doing that. If a local
server could have been updated, it would save bandwidth on the server
doing real work.
Could a trusted group of segemnt dolers be put together? I like the idea
of running a benchmark type of program so that I could multiply keys/sec
times the amount of time I had to donate, and only get a reasonable for
me number of segments.
I would hope that statistics be gathered on the number of keys tested,
elapsed time, etc. so that we all got some more or less real world
insight into key lengths and strengths, effort required to break, that we
have all heard so many projections about... especially as the doling gets
more sophisticated and the number of participants/cycle pool increases.
Will there be Hal3?
Just to ask a really dumb question, how do you know when you get the key?
Is there some plaintext header string you're looking for? --pjp
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