From: Greg Broiles <greg@ideath.goldenbear.com>
Date: Sun, 10 Sep 95 00:07:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Internet commerce mtg, Denver
Message-ID: <199509100705.AA22815@ideath.goldenbear.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


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L. Detweiler's tentacle Vlad Nuri writes:

> [...]
> the rep told me something interesting: he said that every
> Bell phone book is actually "seeded" with dummy names
> so they can detect copyright infringers. if you come out
> with a business directory, these Bells will just scan for
> the fake names that they have inserted into their own listings.
> if they find them, supposedly they can show them to a copyright
> judge and he will immediately close down your operation and
> fine you, almost no questions asked. I didn't know how much
> of this really happens (the legal stuff sounded questionable
> to me) but it is an interesting "real world" instance of
> copyright terrorism prevention that the "information liberation
> front" would have to contend with. 

While he's correct that publishers of data compilations do use
dummy entries to track [mis]use of their data, he's incorrect when
he asserts that it's possible to get a copyright on an ordinary
white-pages style directory. (_Feist v. Rural Telephone_, 499 US 340
(1991), http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/classics/499_340v.htm ).
This practice occurs when mailing lists are sold, and in the 
drafting of maps (non-existent streets or sections of streets may
be added, or changed in an unremarkable way). 

It's also possible (and getting easier with laser printers, etc) to
generate apparently indentical but distinguishable documents for
use where disclosure of the documents is controlled; the distinguishing
parts (perhaps a misspelled word or other apparent typo, or a change
in line spacing between paragraphs, or altered line breaks) can then
be used to trace a recovered "leaked" document to the person who
received it originally. Where the documents are digital (or
digitizable), two or recipients could collude to 'diff' their 
copies, and find the barium data; but a savvy document-distributor
could generate copies with multiple ID-bits, such that any two copies
might have differences between the two, but barium data that's the
same yet different from the other participants. So those two 
colluders round up a third recipient [...] It's basically a form of
very-low-bandwidth text-only steganography.  

Of course, we're wandering into FAQ territory; isn't there something
in the Cyphernomicon about digital signatures for physical items 
being used as proof of source? (e.g., you'll know that the expensive
motorcycle part you just bought really *is* from Harley-Davidson,
not a cheaper part placed in a knockoff Harley box) 
 

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