1995-09-15 - Re: Why ecash is traceable

Header Data

From: “Donald M. Kitchen” <don@cs.byu.edu>
To: tcmay@got.net
Message Hash: 1d050df24879d5e8c164a46ca5742ac599a878ac047fdc8c500e6d9bcf4fa07e
Message ID: <199509150847.CAA03047@bert.cs.byu.edu>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1995-09-15 08:48:22 UTC
Raw Date: Fri, 15 Sep 95 01:48:22 PDT

Raw message

From: "Donald M. Kitchen" <don@cs.byu.edu>
Date: Fri, 15 Sep 95 01:48:22 PDT
To: tcmay@got.net
Subject: Re: Why ecash is traceable
Message-ID: <199509150847.CAA03047@bert.cs.byu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


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Excellent discussion on the subject, actually. However, your idea of
the "first person to the bank" maintaining anonymity via remailer block
is flawed. First of all, if a collusion with the bank is being taken into
account, presumably sufficient enough resources are involved that someone
may try and track the reply block. Mixmaster (as your messages mentioned
by name) would be necessary to eliminate the chance of tracking the block
through combinations of replay attacks etc. (Which reminds me, has anyone
implemented an Expiration date on Type I remailers yet?? I remember someone
telling me it was being put into the RFC) However, mix does not have a
reply block system. Nor are there any Type I -> Mix gateways, for reasons
mentioned months ago. (PS, For historical sake, I was a strong supporter
of a Shamir Sharing Shell Game[tm] with the type I message. Everything
during those months came out of a rant program, so I can hardly expect you
to have saved them)
 
Soooo... Anyone up for a Shamir Sharing Shell game? Of course, a drop
box system would be *much* sexier. Combined with, say, an encrypted socket,
or maybe MIXing a packet straight to your door. (Every client a mix site,
remember? Just make yourself a mix key and give it to the drop box. I
figure if the TLA has you by then, you might as well trust the drop-box
operator too)
 
ObMiscCrypto:
Cypherpunk archives seem to have been down for a month, and a mailto://
didn't wake anybody up.
 
I got a message from Bob Silverman, apparently he would not be opposed
to giving his software to the C-punk key Cracking Ring, Inc. as a group
on the understanding that the group lend him some factored numbers.
He reports having no PGP key, so getting a PGP sig won't be happening.
Perhaps someone who knows him or someone who knows about factoring
software would volunteer to get the goods? 

ObHiMom: Hi Mom.

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<don@cs.byu.edu>           fRee cRyPTo!   jOin the hUnt or BE tHe PrEY
PGP key - http://bert.cs.byu.edu/~don     or PubKey servers (0x994b8f39)
  June 7&14, 1995: 1st amendment repealed.  Death threats ALWAYS pgp signed
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