From: Bryce Wilcox <wilcoxb@nagina.cs.colorado.edu>
Date: Fri, 15 Sep 95 21:35:39 PDT
To: Hal <hfinney@shell.portal.com>
Subject: Re: Why ecash is traceable
In-Reply-To: <199509150532.WAA08865@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <199509160435.WAA26877@nagina.cs.colorado.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Hal <hfinney@shell.portal.com> wrote:
>
> But this correlation is what makes the coin traceable.  Suppose Alice is 
> paying a coin to Bob via an anonymous network, and she and the bank 
> are going to try to figure out who he really is.  She goes through the 
> payment transaction, and Bob sends his resulting data to the bank.  
> Before doing so, though, Alice simulates a payment of the same coin to 
> Charlie.  Charlie doesn't actually have to be involved, Alice can just 
> go through what she would have done if she had spent the coin elsewhere.  
> The result of this simulated payment has been shared with the bank.
> 
> Now, when Bob deposits his data, the bank compares it with the data 
> Alice sent, the result of her simulated spending of the same coin.  By 
> the argument presented above, Bob's deposit will be flagged.  It will 
> correlate with the data Alice sent in since this will be the equivalent 
> of a double-spending.  So when Bob makes the deposit he can be linked to 
> the specific coin payment which Alice made, and his anonymity is lost.


So Alice/TheBank are able to tell that the nym whom Alice gave the coin to
is the same as the nym who deposited it.  If Bob has a pseudonymous
account at the bank, and it was the same pseudonymous account that he used in
the transaction with Alice, then they haven't learned anything new, but if he
wants to use one pseudonym when dealing with Alice and another to deposit the
coin he got from her then he has problems.


That's the extent of the damage, right?  Seems like it can be prevented by
laundering the coin through a single pseudonym first.  That is:  Bob receives
the coin from Alice, calling himself "CyberBob".  He deposits the coin with
the bank as a one-time-nym "Nym#2837004", then he has that nym withdraw the 
same amount of money from its account (closing out the account) and transfers
it to the nym which will actually keep the money, "NormalBob".  He destroys 
the new blinding factors after the temporary nym has withdrawn the coin, 
he deposits the coin with the bank as "NormalBob", and now he is in the clear.


Am I missing anything?


If Bob's transaction with Alice was actually pseudonymous rather than
anonymous then he can just deposit the coin using the same pseudonym and they
haven't learned anything new.  Once he has done that he can safely transfer
the money to any other nym of his with no risk (except for traffic analysis,
physical surveillance, yadda yadda yadda).


So current (DigiCash "ecash") Chaumian protocol leads to complete 
anonymity/pseudonymity (there oughta be a word for that.  
"self-nym-control"?) in the case that pseudonymous accounts are allowed at
the Bank.


Now one could move this "double-blinding" (isn't that phrase already in 
use?) trick into the cash protocol itself, possibly gaining a performance 
win.  DigiCash is apparently aware of this possibility, but (rightly) 
doesn't consider it important to develop right now.


Regards,

Bryce

signatures follow:


                                    +                                           
      public key on keyservers      /.      island Life in a chaos sea        
      or via finger 0x617c6db9      /           bryce.wilcox@colorado.edu     
                                    ---*                                     

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.2
Comment: Auto-signed with Bryce's Auto-PGP v1.0beta4

iQCVAwUBMFpTOfWZSllhfG25AQHndAQAuOfz4Fohl3e/4Q3eUKKY2nZNG+TdDQEN
FvW1q1KAuGTeGJoNmL6qD4xkV1wXuT7UScN/7BwU+8SsIh3B5Cb834saGsCTjNtb
8EV2zsYqzdJkJ3DuDHQw785gqrNPokug4KPP4LRMt5N+PnPRTAWnq6PRibegsg86
ypFcUOVbLTU=
=K+5k
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----