1995-09-23 - Re: Project: a standard cell random number generator

Header Data

From: “James A. Donald” <jamesd@echeque.com>
To: stewarts@ix.netcom.com
Message Hash: 76a9fbf3e2df32b2675ffda06ac767255c47abd4a117b25e2a7ed273db55371c
Message ID: <199509232108.OAA17020@blob.best.net>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1995-09-23 21:08:32 UTC
Raw Date: Sat, 23 Sep 95 14:08:32 PDT

Raw message

From: "James A. Donald" <jamesd@echeque.com>
Date: Sat, 23 Sep 95 14:08:32 PDT
To: stewarts@ix.netcom.com
Subject: Re: Project: a standard cell random number generator
Message-ID: <199509232108.OAA17020@blob.best.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At 11:52 AM 9/22/95 -0700, David G. Koontz wrote:
> If NSA requires real stochastic results for military crypto, what would
> we as casual cryptographers feel comfortable with?  The Netscape episode
> shows the comfort level needs improving.
>
> How good is good enough?


128 bits of true entropy, in your RNG seed, and never leaked 
is good enough.  (You one way hash the RNG numbers generated, 
to avoid leaking any information about your internal RNG state.)

Your RNG number must of course be based on the full seed, not on
some 16 bit subset of the seed.

To be on the safe side, you might use 128 bytes of seed, or 4K 
bytes of seed, just because gross overkill is cheap, and it is kind 
of nice to have a seed larger than any random numbers you might 
really need.

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