From: jpb@miamisci.org (Joe Block)
To: keelings@wu1.wl.aecl.ca
Message Hash: b70ae94de207996dc66d4803a8571eb9968b0779cc5a7ecc266e13d4b5c4019e
Message ID: <v01520c00ac7d510fd201@[198.79.48.44]>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1995-09-14 12:36:40 UTC
Raw Date: Thu, 14 Sep 95 05:36:40 PDT
From: jpb@miamisci.org (Joe Block)
Date: Thu, 14 Sep 95 05:36:40 PDT
To: keelings@wu1.wl.aecl.ca
Subject: Re: Scientology tries to break PGP - and
Message-ID: <v01520c00ac7d510fd201@[198.79.48.44]>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
re:
>[snip]
>> When the safety is finally removed from the gun at your head (sorry for
>> the drama) you hand over your alternate secret key. If decrypted with the
>> "alternate" or "fake" secret key, the encrypted file is wiped until it
>> reaches a marker; the remainder of the file is displayed. If you use your
>> "primary" or "real key", the extraneous text is simply stripped.
Instead of stripping, how about adding an offset to the start and end of
the ciphertext to each encoded idea key. This way, I can send text A to
key A, text B to key B, C to C and so on. As long as the recipient and
I have agreed in advance on which key to use to exchange the real message,
who can say otherwise? If code words are used in all the messages to
refer to any illegal acts, ("ship me 30 kilos of smack" might be a tad
incriminating) how can anything be proved even if the recipient is
compelled to divulge their key?
An added advantage to this scheme is that if properly used it should help
throw a monkey wrench into traffic analysis by the nosy. If I regularly
exchange encrypted messages with several different recipients, I can
enclose a seperate plaintext for each, make one massive combined
cyphertext and send it to all of them. The ones I have no instructions
or trade secrets for today will each receive "Ignore this message,"
followed by a randomly selected random number of fortunes or other random
data (so each message to be ignored will have different length different
plaintext to further thwart analysis).
This may be combined with stealth PGP headers to make it difficult for
LEAs to determine all recipients for the purpose of getting a subpeona
for their keys.
Joseph Block <jpb@miamisci.org>
"We can't be so fixated on our desire
to preserve the rights of ordinary Americans ..."
-- Bill Clinton (USA TODAY, 11 March 1993, page 2A)
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1995-09-14 (Thu, 14 Sep 95 05:36:40 PDT) - Re: Scientology tries to break PGP - and - jpb@miamisci.org (Joe Block)