1995-09-23 - Re: SSL Man-in-the-middle

Header Data

From: “David J. Bianco” <bianco@itribe.net>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: cf44834c5753eb4dd96f6579cd6b56565b6178335fd63e2816e0010daae882ba
Message ID: <199509231738.NAA25269@gatekeeper.itribe.net>
Reply To: <199509221407.KAA23176@gatekeeper.itribe.net>
UTC Datetime: 1995-09-23 17:41:57 UTC
Raw Date: Sat, 23 Sep 95 10:41:57 PDT

Raw message

From: "David J. Bianco" <bianco@itribe.net>
Date: Sat, 23 Sep 95 10:41:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: SSL Man-in-the-middle
In-Reply-To: <199509221407.KAA23176@gatekeeper.itribe.net>
Message-ID: <199509231738.NAA25269@gatekeeper.itribe.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Sep 22, 10:10, David J. Bianco sent the following to the NSA's mail
archives:
> Subject: SSL Man-in-the-middle
|| I've read through the SSL spec, and it provides authentication for both
|| the server and the client, but these features are rarely used, probably
|| because they are somewhat inconvenient for the user.  A good first step
|| would be to include the IP address of the server in the certificate
|| signed by VeriSign. In this way, browsers could perform automatic checks
|| that the IP address in the certificate is actually the one that's being
|| communicated with. This does raise other questions (such as protecting
|| from IP spoofing), but IMHO would be a good way of providing an
automatic
||  "first check" without inconveniencing users.  The added inconvenience
of
|| obtaining a new certificate when your server's IP address changes is
|| fairly minor, and could be viewed as necessary overhead for doing secure
|| transactions via the Net.
||
||

Of course, the above is complete and utter crap (as Simon Spero pointed out
to me in much, much more polite terms 8-).  Let me take a stab at v2.0:

I've read through the SSL spec, and it provides authentication for both the
server and the client, though these features are rarely used, probably
because they are somewhat inconvenient for the user.  A good practice would
be to always code your SSL app to check that the CN (Common Name) field of
the certificate is the same as the hostname listed in the URL (CN always
appears to be an IP address, at least for Netscape server certificates).


Still, even with the bogus last paragraph, I stand by the rest of my post.
 I obviously haven't seen Netscape source, so I don't really know what
checks it might have, but none of the other SSL apps I've seen have an
auto-check feature, though it doesn't seem to be much more trouble at all.


--
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