1995-09-30 - Re: NetScape’s dependence upon RSA down for the count!

Header Data

From: jbass@dmsd.com (John L. Bass)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: db535a9cf81df7fd01ec9bb074925cf5cd604b0b18bdfb4fbb09384af17e5171
Message ID: <9509302213.AA11359@dmsd.com>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1995-09-30 22:14:10 UTC
Raw Date: Sat, 30 Sep 95 15:14:10 PDT

Raw message

From: jbass@dmsd.com (John L. Bass)
Date: Sat, 30 Sep 95 15:14:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: NetScape's dependence upon RSA down for the count!
Message-ID: <9509302213.AA11359@dmsd.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Ok, several people have asked:

> Please explain to me how you can break SSL using the above method. I
> don't follow your line of thought. How could my fake www server
> intercept and redirect packets to netscape.com short of hacking a DNS
> server?

client ->       filter                          Client sends packet with K(c)
                filter ->       Server          filter forwards packet with K(f)                filter       <- Server          Server sends encrypts with K(f)
client       <- filter                          filter re-encrypts with K(c)

As the protocol progresses the filter also uses the master key,
and follows the renegotiation as the master key expires.


The existance of a working filter is enough to invalidate the security in
NetScape's claims.


hacking a DMS server is one way, spoofing a DNS reply to named is easier,
simply packaging the filter into a router/bridge close to the server
is more effective ... even if hacking the incoming phoneline/T1 line
to the server and inserting a very transparent bridge AKA a phone tap.

There is enough dollars to make the risks ... :)

John

BTW ... how do I join for these two list? Where are they archived to
catchup with past traffic?






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