From: David_A Wagner <daw@CS.Berkeley.EDU>
Date: Wed, 20 Sep 95 17:18:06 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: NYT on Netscape Crack
Message-ID: <199509202353.QAA20322@guaymas.CS.Berkeley.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <9509201034.AA10521@prakinf.tu-ilmenau.de> you write:
> Is it a good idea to use different (unrelated!) seeded PRNG's for the
> challenge data (which can be seen by sniffing) and the masterkey (which
> should never leave out of client's memory?

No.

If the master key PRNG is poorly seeded, this is still exploitable:
for instance, there is a lot of redundancy in most plaintext, and
this can be used to check each candidate key value.

Just use a cryptographically secure PRNG seeded with enough entropy.