From: cmcmanis@scndprsn.Eng.Sun.COM (Chuck McManis)
Date: Mon, 2 Oct 95 09:19:56 PDT
To: Don.Stephenson@Eng.Sun.COM
Subject: Re: NetScape's dependence upon RSA down for the count!
Message-ID: <9510021608.AA08689@pepper.Eng.Sun.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Don wrote:

>I haven't read the SSL spec for a while but my understanding was that 
>the server passed it's public key to the client via a certificate 
>signed by a mutually trusted certificate authority (i.e., Verisign).
>
>How would the filter be able to forge such a certificate ?

Why forge it? Why not simply buy a netsite server with a valid certificate.
Let's say you paid full list for it $5000. It is the classic MITM attack
but the protection against that attack was generally that the parties
communicating "knew" each other. 

This is a fundamental weakness of putting the security at the SSL level as
opposed to a possibly higher level. With the netscape attack since your
client never cares "how" (or to whom) the SSL connection is made, it never
shows you the information about where the source key came from. Only that
it is valid.

--Chuck